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TOWARD A STANDARD FOR A FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE 
CLAIM UNDER THE NEW JERSEY LAW AGAINST 
DISCRIMINATION 
Andrew J. Obergfell* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Victor v. State, the New Jersey Supreme Court was called upon 
to decide whether a claim of failure to accommodate a disability under 
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) required the 
plaintiff to prove, as part of the prima facie case, that he suffered an 
adverse employment consequence as a result of his employer failing to 
accommodate the disability, or whether simply failing to accommodate 
the disability was sufficient to warrant an actionable claim under the 
LAD.1 
The plaintiff, Roy Victor, brought a claim against the State of New 
Jersey, the New Jersey State Police, and certain individual defendants, 
alleging, inter alia, failure to accommodate under the LAD.2  Victor’s 
case involved an unusual set of circumstances; namely that Victor, after 
returning from disability leave for a back injury, claimed to have re-
aggravated his injury, rendering him unable to fulfill his duties as a 
state trooper on road patrol.3  As a result, Victor requested an 
accommodation in the form of performing administrative tasks rather 
than his normal duties.4  Because Victor had been medically cleared 
for full duty status, his supervisor required him to undertake his 
normal duties.5  The result was a four-hour period during which Victor 
was required to perform full duties despite his request for an 
accommodation.6  Victor was not discharged or demoted, nor did he 
claim constructive discharge.7  Thus, the question arose as to whether 
 
* J.D., 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Drew University. 
 1  See Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383 (2010). 
 2  Id. at 389–90. 
 3  Id. at 391–92. 
 4  Id. at 392.  
 5  Id.  
 6  Id. at 393.  
 7  See generally Victor, 203 N.J. 383.  
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this four-hour period, during which Victor was required to perform his 
full duties without an accommodation, constituted an actionable claim 
under the LAD for failure to accommodate, even though he did not 
suffer an adverse employment consequence. 
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s ruling that an 
adverse employment consequence “is presumed by the failure to 
accommodate or that plaintiff’s claimed psychological suffering 
unequivocally qualifies.”8  Instead, the Appellate Division held that the 
jury charge, which failed to “require a finding that plaintiff suffered an 
adverse employment action,” was insufficient because an adverse 
employment consequence must be found in order to establish a claim 
of failure to accommodate under the LAD.9  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court was set to provide a definitive answer to the question yet failed 
to do so, holding instead that Victor could establish neither that he was 
disabled on December 11, 2003 nor that he sought a reasonable 
accommodation.10  Thus, the question remains unresolved.  
Importantly, the court included dicta which strongly suggested that no 
additional adverse employment consequence would be needed to state 
a prima facie case.11 
After the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in Victor, there has 
been considerable disagreement among courts in New Jersey as to how 
to apply the prima facie case for failure to accommodate under the LAD.  
This disagreement stems from the court’s failure to decide the core 
question while offering dicta that no adverse employment consequence 
would be necessary to state a prima facie case.  As will be discussed infra, 
some courts have continued to require proof of an adverse 
employment consequence, while others have relied on the court’s 
suggestion in dicta and have omitted the adverse employment 
consequence element entirely. 
This Comment examines the divergent lines of cases stemming 
from the Victor decision and argues that under the proper construction 
of the LAD, and as a matter of public policy, the court in Victor was 
correct to suggest that no adverse employment consequence should be 
necessary to support a claim of failure to accommodate under the 
LAD.  Part II of this Comment examines the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination in the context of disability discrimination.  This section 
 
 8  Victor v. State, 401 N.J. Super. 596, 617 (App. Div. 2008), aff’d as modified, 203 
N.J. 383 (2010). 
 9  Id.  
 10  Victor, 203 N.J. at 422–23.  
 11  See id. at 421–22. .  
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also examines the failure to accommodate issue under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), to which New Jersey courts look for 
guidance.12  Part II concludes with a more thorough analysis of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Victor and its conflict with the 
Appellate Division.  Part III examines Victor’s effect on failure to 
accommodate jurisprudence under the LAD.  It surveys two divergent 
lines of cases that have developed since the Victor decision, one of 
which views an adverse employment consequence as necessary and one 
of which, relying on the Supreme Court’s language in dicta, omits this 
element.  Part IV begins by urging the New Jersey Supreme Court to 
grant certification to decide this important question, because courts 
have struggled with the issue of how to articulate the prima facie case 
after Victor.  It also considers the remedy to which the employee should 
be entitled if no adverse employment consequence is necessary.  
Further, Part IV argues that interpreting the LAD to require an adverse 
employment consequence restricts the duty to accommodate to those 
accommodations necessary to perform the job.  Such an interpretation 
is out of line with prevailing interpretations of the LAD and, 
additionally, with the ADA.  Part V concludes that failing to 
accommodate the disability, even without an adverse employment 
consequence, should be an actionable claim under the LAD. 
II.  THE LAD, THE ADA, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION, AND FAILURE TO 
ACCOMMODATE IN LIGHT OF VICTOR 
A. The LAD 
In passing the LAD, the New Jersey Legislature found that: 
[P]ractices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants, 
because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, 
sex, gender identity or expression, affectional or sexual 
orientation, marital status, familial status, liability for service 
in the Armed Forces of the United States, disability or 
nationality, are matters of concern to the government of the 
State, and that such discrimination threatens not only the 
rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants of the State 
but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free 
democratic State[.]13 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that it is “the clear public 
policy of this State . . . to abolish discrimination in the work place.  
 
 12  Victor, 401 N.J. Super. at 612.  
 13  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (2007).  
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Indeed, the overarching goal of the Law is nothing less than the 
eradication ‘of the cancer of discrimination.’”14 
The New Jersey legislature enacted the LAD in 1945, which, at the 
time, did not provide protections for those with disabilities; such 
protections did not appear until 1972.15  In that year, a new subsection 
of the LAD was enacted to extend the statute’s reach to cover persons 
with physical disabilities.16  It stated that the provision was to be 
construed to “prohibit any unlawful discrimination against any person 
because such person is or has been at any time disabled or any unlawful 
employment practice against such person, unless the nature and 
extent of the disability reasonably precludes the performance of the 
particular employment.”17  Thus, at the outset, people with disabilities 
were given their own statutory protection rather than being added as 
a protected class under the more general provisions of the statute.18  
Moreover, protection for disabled persons was limited by the 
individual’s ability to perform the functions of his or her 
employment.19  In Victor, the court explained that “unlike other 
protected classes, a person’s physical disability might interfere with full 
and unfettered equal treatment.”20  Since the time that protection for 
disabled persons was recognized, the statute has been amended to 
include additional protections.21  For example, in 1978, the Legislature 
expanded the statute by eliminating the requirement of a physical 
disability and by including certain mental and psychological 
disabilities.22 
It was not until 2003 that the LAD was expanded to include 
“disability” as a protected status akin to the original protected classes.23  
Under the LAD, the legislature defined disability to include physical 
disabilities, “mental, psychological, or developmental” disabilities, and 
AIDS or HIV infection.24 Despite defining the term “disability,” and 
 
 14  Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334 (1988) (quoting Jackson v. Concord Co., 
54 N.J. 113, 124 (1969)). 
 15  Victor, 203 N.J. at 398 (citing 1972 N.J. Laws Ch. 114).   
 16  Id. 
 17  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (2004). 
 18  Victor, 203 N.J. at 399. 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id.  
 21  Id. at 400. 
 22  1978 N.J. Laws Ch. 137 § 3; see also Victor, 203 N.J. at 400.   
 23  2003 N.J. Laws Ch. 180 § 4. 
 24  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (2010). The statute provides greater clarity by 
defining disability as:  
physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is 
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despite the ADA’s earlier recognition of failure to accommodate as a 
subset of disability discrimination, the LAD itself does not include the 
term “failure to accommodate.”  Rather, that term appears in the 
regulations supplementing the statute.25 
N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll 
employers shall conduct their employment procedures in such a 
manner as to assure that all people with disabilities are given equal 
consideration with people who do not have disabilities for all aspects 
of employment . . . .”26  The term “all aspects of employment” includes 
“hiring, promotion, tenure, training, assignment, transfers, and leaves 
on the basis of their qualifications and abilities.”27  The reasonable 
accommodation language appears in N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b), which 
states that “[a]n employer must make a reasonable accommodation to 
the limitations of a[n] employee . . . who is a person with a disability, 
unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of its business.”28  The 
 
caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy and 
other seizure disorders, and which shall include, but not be limited to, 
any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination, 
blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, 
muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on a service or 
guide dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device, or any 
mental, psychological or developmental disability, including autism 
spectrum disorders, resulting from anatomical, psychological, 
physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the normal 
exercise of any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable, medically 
or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic 
techniques. Disability shall also mean AIDS or HIV infection.  
Id. 
 25  See Potente v. Cnty. of Hudson, 187 N.J. 103, 110–11 (2006). 
Administrative regulations set out the specific requirements of the 
reasonable accommodation process mandated by the LAD.  In brief, 
unless it would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the 
business, N.J.A.C. 13:13–2.5(b) requires an employer to make a 
‘reasonable accommodation to the limitations of an employee . . . who 
is a person with a disability.’  However, an employer is not required to 
take action ‘where it can reasonably be determined that an . . . employee, 
as a result of the individual’s disability, cannot perform the essential 
function of the job even with reasonable accommodation.’ 
Id.  
See also Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of the Superior Court of N.J., 351 N.J. Super. 385, 396 
(App. Div. 2002) (“The LAD does not specifically address reasonable accommodation, 
but our courts have uniformly held that the law nevertheless requires an employer to 
reasonably accommodate an employee’s handicap.”) 
 26  N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:13-2.5 (2012). 
 27  Id. 
 28  Id. 
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determination of whether an employer failed to make a reasonable 
accommodation is made on a case-by-case basis.29 
To determine whether an accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship on the employer, the following factors must be 
examined: 
The overall size of the employer’s business with respect to the 
number of employees, number and type of facilities, and size 
of budget; [t]he type of the employer’s operations, including 
the composition and structure of the employer’s workforce; 
[t]he nature and cost of the accommodation needed, taking 
into consideration the availability of tax credits and 
deductions and/or outside funding; and [t]he extent to 
which accommodation would involve waiver of an essential 
requirement of a job as opposed to a tangential or non-
business necessity requirement.30 
Such is the general statutory framework regarding a claim of failure to 
accommodate under the LAD.  Before examining New Jersey case law 
under the LAD, it is instructive to first undertake an inquiry of the 
pertinent ADA provisions. 
B. The ADA and Failure to Accommodate 
When the LAD is unclear, New Jersey courts will “rely on the 
federal courts and their construction of federal laws for guidance.”31  
Under the ADA: 
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or 
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.32 
This rule has been interpreted to require an “adverse employment 
action” for a violation of the statute because “the general rule 
established in section (a) qualifies the word ‘discriminate’ with the 
phrase ‘in regard to’ and then lists several forms of employment-
related actions.”33  Thus, the statute suggests that there is a link 
between the discrimination and the adverse employment 
 
 29  Id. 
 30  Id. 
 31  Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 398 (2010). 
 32  42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). 
 33  Victor, 203 N.J. at 411. 
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consequence.34  This interpretation has not been universally accepted, 
however.35 
The statute continues, in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b), to define the 
phrase “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of 
disability” as: 
[N]ot making reasonable accommodations to the known 
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, 
unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the business of such covered entity.36 
The term “disability” under the ADA is defined as “(A) a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”37 
The statute explains that “reasonable accommodation” may 
consist of “making existing facilities used by employees readily 
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities” or “job 
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to 
a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, 
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training 
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, 
and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”38 
Federal courts have interpreted the language of the ADA to 
require an employer to engage in an interactive process.  For example, 
the Third Circuit in Taylor v. Phoenixville School District, relying on a 
federal regulation interpreting the ADA,39 reasoned that an employer 
must engage in an interactive process.40  The court created a four-factor 
 
 34  Marshall v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“As the 
language of § 12112(a) makes clear, for discrimination (including denial of reasonable 
accommodation) to be actionable, it must occur in regard to some adverse personnel 
decision or other term or condition of employment.”). 
 35  Megan I. Brennan, Need I Prove More: Why an Adverse Employment Action Prong has 
no Place in a Failure to Accommodate Disability Claim, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 497, 504–05 
(2013) (explaining the different interpretations of the ADA’s language and 
concluding that “a more straightforward reading of the ADA leads to the conclusion 
that no separate adverse action is necessary.”) 
 36  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
 37  § 12102. 
 38  § 12111. 
 39  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2012) (“To determine the appropriate reasonable 
accommodation it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, 
interactive process with the [employee] in need of the accommodation.”). 
 40  Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 318–19 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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test to determine whether the employer properly engaged in an 
interactive process, which requires the plaintiff to show that 
(1) the employer knew about the employee’s disability; (2) 
the employee requested accommodations or assistance for 
her disability; (3) the employer did not make a good faith 
effort to assist the employee in seeking accommodations; and 
(4) the employee could have been reasonably 
accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith.”41 
Importantly, however, the court did not suggest that the four factors 
“created the entirety of the proofs that a plaintiff must advance in 
order to recover under the ADA for a failure to accommodate.  Rather, 
the opinion established its overall framework by identifying the 
elements of the prima facie case for ADA discrimination that all 
plaintiffs must prove, including an adverse employment 
consequence.”42  Thus, despite introducing the four-factor test for an 
interactive process into the analysis, it is not, on its own, legally 
significant in that the same overarching framework applies, which 
requires the plaintiff to show that: 
(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; 
(2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential 
functions of the job, with or without reasonable 
accommodations by the employer; and (3) he has suffered 
an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of 
discrimination.43 
As the court in Victor explained, “[t]he Taylor decision . . . did not 
divorce failure to accommodate from the essential elements of all 
other disability discrimination claims; rather, the elements of the 
failure to accommodate claim appear as a subset of the second prong 
of the ordinary prima facie case.”44 
Despite the articulation in Taylor of the prima facie case for failure 
to accommodate, the question of whether an adverse employment 
consequence is needed remains unsettled among the circuits, namely 
the question of whether, under the statute, failing to accommodate a 
disability, even without an adverse employment consequence, is itself 
actionable because a failure to do so necessarily contravenes the 
statute.  As one author explained: 
To establish a failure to accommodate claim, the plaintiff 
 
 41  Id. at 319–20. 
 42  Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 415–16 (2010).  
 43  Taylor, 184 F.3d at 306. 
 44  Victor, 203 N.J. at 416. 
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must show he: (1) is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; 
(2) the employer is subject to the ADA and on notice of the 
disability and need for the accommodation; and (3) that the 
employee could perform the essential functions of the 
position with a reasonable accommodation.  However, there 
is a split amongst the courts regarding the remaining 
elements.  Some courts only require one additional element 
– a showing that the defendant failed to reasonably 
accommodate the plaintiff.  On the other hand, certain 
courts mandate that the plaintiff also prove that he suffered 
an adverse employment action.  In other circuits, it remains 
unclear whether an adverse action is necessary to state a 
claim.  The dispute and confusion is attributable, at least in 
part, to parties and courts failing to clearly differentiate 
between disparate treatment and failure to accommodate 
claims.  Although disparate treatment and the failure to 
accommodate may sometimes coexist, they are different 
types of discrimination.  Sometimes this critical distinction 
gets lost in the analysis.45 
For example, in Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police 
Department, the court articulated the prima facie case, including the 
adverse employment consequence element, but then went on to state 
that “[a]dverse employment decisions in this context include refusing 
to make reasonable accommodations for a plaintiff’s disabilities.”46  
Thus, the court stated that refusal to make an accommodation for an 
employee would itself be an adverse employment consequence, and 
therefore that no additional adverse employment consequence would 
be needed in order to satisfy the prima facie case.  It is important to note 
that Williams was terminated, clearly an adverse employment 
consequence, thereby rendering the adverse employment 
consequence discussion dicta.47 
The Seventh Circuit has similarly articulated that no adverse 
employment consequence would be necessary under the ADA.  In 
Stevens v. Illinois Department of Transportation, the court stated the prima 
facie case as requiring plaintiff to prove: “(1) that she is disabled; (2) 
that she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the 
job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that the 
employer took an adverse job action against her because of her 
 
 45  Brennan, supra note 35, at 500–02.  
 46  Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 47  Id. at 758. 
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disability or failed to make a reasonable accommodation.”48  Finally, an 
Illinois district court also rejected any need for proof of an adverse 
employment consequence for a claim of failure to accommodate 
under the ADA.49  The court stated that the ADA cannot be read to 
create “employer liability only if the employee suffered an adverse 
employment action because of his disability.  Under this construction 
an employer would not be liable in situations where known disabilities 
are not accommodated simply for management’s laziness or cost 
benefit analysis.”50  The court concluded that an employer “cannot 
escape liability under the ADA just because its failure to accommodate 
did not result in an adverse employment action.”51  Other circuits, 
however, have continued to require proof of an adverse employment 
consequence.52 
C. New Jersey Case Law Leading up to the Victor Decision 
Prior to Victor, published opinions in New Jersey recited three 
elements of a prima facie case for failure to accommodate: “(1) the 
plaintiff had a LAD handicap; (2) was qualified to perform the 
essential functions of the job, with or without accommodation; and (3) 
suffered an adverse employment action because of the handicap.”53  
Thus, New Jersey case law prior to Victor included the adverse 
employment consequence element in the analysis.  In Tynan v. Vicinage 
13 of Superior Court,54 the Appellate Division adopted the Taylor court’s 
requirement that an employer must engage in an interactive process.55  
The court implemented the four-factor test articulated in Taylor.56  
Thus, the analysis under the LAD is very similar to that under the ADA. 
 
 48  Stevens v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 210 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis 
added). 
 49  Nawrot v. CPC Int’l, 259 F. Supp. 2d 716, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 50  Id. at 724.  
 51  Id. 
 52  See, e.g., Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 716 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(a plaintiff must demonstrate he or she suffered from an adverse employment 
consequence in order to “overcome . . . initial burden of establishing a prima facie 
case”).  
 53  Bosshard v. Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr., 345 N.J. Super. 78, 91 (App. Div. 
2001). 
 54  Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Super. Ct., 351 N.J. Super. 385, 400 (App. Div. 2002). 
 55  Tynan, 351 N.J. Super. at 400–401; see also Victor v. State, 401 N.J. Super. 596, 
613 (App. Div. 2008).  
 56  Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 319 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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D. Victor v. State 
As aforementioned, Victor presented facts in which the failure to 
accommodate was unaccompanied by any other adverse employment 
consequence.  The plaintiff, Roy Victor, a New Jersey State Trooper, 
suffered a back injury in 1995 and, because of complications with his 
back and a stress-related disorder, was on and off of medical leave for 
lengthy periods between 1995 and 2003.57  In December of 2003, Victor 
returned to “full-duty” status, which as a “Trooper I” required him to 
be “on road patrol” and wear a protective vest.58  When Victor returned 
to work on December 11, he told his Assistant Station Manager, 
Sergeant O’Rourke, that he had re-injured his back between being 
cleared for “full-duty” status and returning for work.59  Victor told 
O’Rourke that he wanted to perform administrative tasks instead of his 
normal duties because he believed the protective vest would aggravate 
his back injury.60  The Station Commander, to whom the matter was 
ultimately referred, confirmed that Victor had been cleared for full 
duty status and required Victor to undertake his normal duties.61  
Victor did not “request sick leave, ask that he be permitted to visit the 
division doctor, or produce anything to document his claim that he 
was injured, but instead put on his protective vest and went out on road 
patrol.”62  Victor took sick leave for the final two hours of his shift and 
later saw two division doctors.  Victor was later placed on off-duty status 
due to depression and stress, but no documentation was produced to 
support his claim of a back injury.63  The issue was the four-hour period 
during which Victor claimed he was not accommodated and forced to 
undertake his normal duties.64 
During the trial, the parties took opposing stances as to whether 
an adverse employment consequence was needed to state a failure to 
accommodate claim, and the issue was brought before the trial court 
in the charge conference.65  Defendants sought to include an adverse 
employment consequence element as part of the prima facie case, but 
the trial court refused to so instruct the jury.66  The trial court reasoned 
 
 57  Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 390 (2010). 
 58  Id. at 391. 
 59  Id.  
 60  Id. at 392. 
 61  Id.  
 62  Id.  
 63  Victor, 203 N.J. at 392.  
 64  Id. at 388. 
 65  Id. at 393.  
 66  Id.  
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that if all the other elements are proven, failure to accommodate a 
disability is in and of itself an adverse employment action.67  The trial 
court re-affirmed this position in denying a post-verdict motion for a 
new trial.68 
Defendants appealed, arguing that the jury charge omitting the 
adverse employment consequence element was flawed.69  The 
Appellate Division reversed the trial court and held that an adverse 
employment consequence was necessary to establish a prima facie case 
for failure to accommodate a disability under the LAD.70  Moreover, 
the court specified what may qualify as an adverse employment 
consequence, holding that 
[A]n employer’s adverse employment action must rise above 
something that makes an employee unhappy, resentful or 
otherwise cause an incidental workplace dissatisfaction . . . 
actions that affect wages, benefits, or result in direct 
economic harm qualify . . . [as do] noneconomic actions that 
cause a significant, non-temporary adverse change in 
employment status or the terms and conditions of 
employment.71 
The court remanded for a new trial, stating that “the [jury] charge was 
legally insufficient as it incorrectly stated the applicable law by failing 
to require a finding that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment 
action.”72 
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the petition for 
certification,73 presumably to provide a definitive answer to whether an 
adverse employment consequence is a necessary element of failure to 
accommodate under the LAD.  But, the court held that even assuming 
arguendo that no adverse employment consequence was needed, Victor 
still could not establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate 
because he could establish neither that he was disabled on the date in 
question nor that he had sought a reasonable accommodation.74  
Instead of resolving the issue, the court stated: 
In spite of our recognition that the broad remedial sweep of 
our LAD demands vigilance in our protection of the rights 
 
 67  Id. at 395.  
 68  Id. at 393. 
 69  Victor, 203 N.J. at 393.  
 70  Victor v. State, 401 N.J. Super. 596, 617 (App. Div. 2008).  
 71  Id. at 616.  
 72  Id. at 617. 
 73  Victor v. State, 199 N.J. 542 (2009). 
 74  Victor, 203 N.J. at 422–23. 
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of persons with disabilities, and as compelling as their plight 
is in facing workplace challenges that are uniquely theirs, we 
are constrained to refrain from resolving today the question 
of whether a failure to accommodate unaccompanied by an 
adverse employment consequence may be actionable.75 
The court was careful to note that it did not rule “based on [the] 
conclusion that there can be no claim for failure to accommodate 
absent an adverse employment consequence, because we have found 
this record an inappropriate one on which to decide that important 
question.”76  Moreover, in dicta, the court stated that the “LAD’s 
purposes suggest that we chart a course to permit plaintiffs to proceed 
against employers who have failed to reasonably accommodate their 
disabilities or who have failed to engage in an interactive process even 
if they can point to no adverse employment consequence that 
resulted.”77  The court declined to “entirely foreclose the possibility of 
circumstances that would give rise to a claim for failure to 
accommodate even without an identifiable adverse employment 
consequence.”78  After providing this lengthy analysis in dicta, the Court 
concluded that “regardless of whether or not there is room in the 
LAD’s strong protective embrace of persons with disabilities to 
recognize that there may be circumstances in which a failure to 
accommodate in and of itself gives rise to a cause of action, this 
plaintiff’s claim for failure to accommodate cannot meet the proofs 
required on his prima facie case.”79 
Thus, Victor created tension by foreshadowing a change in the law 
without making a definitive determination on the issue.  This has led 
to difficulties in interpretation by courts facing claims of failure to 
accommodate in later cases. 
III.  APPLICATION OF VICTOR IN LATER NEW JERSEY CASES ALLEGING 
FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE 
After Victor, two competing lines of cases developed in 
interpreting the requirements for a prima facie case of failure to 
accommodate under the LAD.  Some of the cases rely on the published 
opinions in New Jersey issued before the Victor decision which include 
the adverse employment consequence element in the prima facie case.  
 
 75  Id. at 422.  
 76  Id. at 424–25. 
 77  Id. at 421.  
 78  Id. at 422.  
 79  Id. at 425.  
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Others, however, have relied on the language in Victor, suggesting that 
no additional adverse employment consequence is necessary.  The 
latter line of cases interprets Victor as a de facto elimination of the 
adverse employment consequence element. 
A. Adverse Employment Consequence Required 
The first line of cases has read the language in Victor as dicta and 
has continued to apply the adverse employment consequence element.  
For example, in Zack v. State,80 the Appellate Division considered a case 
in which the plaintiff left her position voluntarily and had to rely on a 
theory of constructive discharge to meet the adverse employment 
consequence element of the prima facie case.81  In Zack, the plaintiff, 
after striking her head on a metal cabinet, suffered from post-
concussion syndrome and hypersensitivity to light and certain odors, 
in addition to cognitive impairment and migraines.82  The employer 
accommodated the plaintiff by relocating her workstation away from 
the windows and removing the light fixture from her cubicle.83  The 
plaintiff was ultimately moved to a new floor, where she complained 
that a cubicle about twelve feet from her workspace was reconfigured, 
which caused additional light to enter her cubicle.84  Plaintiff’s 
continued opposition to lighting in the office space was deemed 
unreasonable, causing her to ultimately submit her resignation.85 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, 
holding that “defendants had reasonably accommodated plaintiff’s 
disability [and that] the plaintiff suffered no adverse employment 
action.”86  The Appellate Division considered two issues on appeal, 
namely “whether defendants provided a ‘reasonable accommodation’ 
to plaintiff; and . . . whether plaintiff suffered the adverse employment 
action of ‘constructive discharge.’”87 The Appellate Division, in its 
analysis, stated that the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Victor, left open 
the “important question” of “whether an adverse employment 
consequence is an essential element of a plaintiff’s claim that his 
employer discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his 
 
 80  No. A-3414-09T3, 2012 WL 832611 (App. Div. Mar. 14, 2012). 
 81  Id.  
 82  Id. at *1. 
 83  Id.  
 84  Id. at *3. 
 85  Id.  
 86  Zack, 2012 WL 832611, at *3. 
 87  Id. at *4. 
OBERGFELL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:11 PM 
2015] COMMENT 991 
 
disability.”88  Importantly, the court stated that “[d]espite Victor’s legacy 
of uncertainty,89 under prevailing legal standards, the third element of 
a prima facie for employment discrimination based on disability 
requires plaintiff to show she suffered an adverse employment action 
due to her handicap.”90 Thus, because the court required the plaintiff 
to prove that she suffered an adverse employment consequence, 
plaintiff had to rely on a theory of constructive discharge.91  A claim of 
constructive discharge creates a high bar for the plaintiff, requiring 
her to prove “not merely ‘severe or pervasive’ conduct, but conduct 
that is so intolerable that a reasonable person would be forced to resign 
rather than continue to endure it.”92  As another court explained, 
constructive discharge contemplates “outrageous,” “coercive,” and 
“unconscionable” acts.93 
The court first held that the defendants routinely complied with 
plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation requests except when plaintiff’s 
“requests conflicted with work-safety issues.”94 In light of defendants’ 
repeated compliance with plaintiff’s requests, with only a few, 
legitimate exceptions, the court ultimately held that “no rational jury 
could find defendants failed to provide plaintiff with a reasonable 
accommodation to enable her to perform the essential function of her 
job.”95  Importantly, despite the fact that the court’s initial conclusion 
was sufficient to uphold the grant of summary judgment, the court, in 
the alternative, also held that “[b]ecause plaintiff’s adverse 
employment action is directly related to establishing this element of 
her prima facie case—that defendants created an intolerable work 
environment by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation—this 
part of her case likewise fails.”96 
Zack is significant because it is an example of the court applying 
 
 88  Id. at *3 (citing Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 386, 388 (2010)).  
 89  See also Nead v. Union Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm’n, No. A-3149-09T1, 2011 WL 
166245, at *9 (App. Div. Jan. 20, 2011) (acknowledging that the court in Victor “strongly 
suggested that such a claim may not necessarily require anything more than the failure 
to engage in an interactive dialogue with the employee,” but conceding that “the Court 
itself noted that this comment was dicta, and left for another day the ultimate 
determination”). 
 90  Zack, 2012 WL 832611, at *4. 
 91  Id. 
 92  Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 28 (2002) (citing Jones 
v. Aluminum Shapes, Inc., 339 N.J. Super. 412, 428 (App. Div. 2001)).  
 93  Jones, 339 N.J. Super. at 428. 
 94  Zack, 2012 WL 832611, at *5. 
 95  Id. at *5. 
 96  Id. 
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the adverse employment consequence element after Victor, requiring 
the plaintiff to rely on constructive discharge, a high bar, in order to 
establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate. Presumably, had 
it been the case in Zack that the plaintiff’s requests for 
accommodations were reasonable, the adverse employment 
consequence element would have been the dispositive factor denying 
her claim for relief. 
The next significant case is Alotto v. ECSM Utility Contractors, Inc.97  
In Allotto, the plaintiff was a utility locator, and as part of her job she 
was required to respond to emergencies beyond regular business 
hours.98  Plaintiff suffered from insomnia, and as a result of her 
insomnia medication she could not drive a vehicle and could not be 
on-call.99  Plaintiff requested to be removed completely from on-call 
duty.100  Plaintiff, via e-mail, left her position when her employer 
requested a doctor’s note indicating that she could fulfill her 
obligations as a utility locator, including the on-call requirement.101 
In its analysis, the court included the adverse employment 
consequence element, stating that in order to establish a prima facie 
case for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff “must make out the first 
three elements of the disability discrimination case” and introduce 
evidence that they engaged in an interactive process as required by the 
court in Taylor.102  Moreover, in a footnote, the court noted that: 
[i]n Victor v. State, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered 
at length when a plaintiff may bring a failure to 
accommodate claim where there was no adverse employment 
action apart from the failure to accommodate.  Despite its 
lengthy analysis of the issue and its recognition of the broad 
remedial sweep of the NJLAD, the court ultimately declined 
to decide the issue.  Therefore, an adverse employment 
action remains a required element of a prima facie failure to 
accommodate case.103 
In Alotto, the lack of an adverse employment consequence was a 
key inquiry in the court’s analysis.  Much like the plaintiff in Zack,104 the 
 
 97  No. 09-1144, 2010 WL 5186127, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2010).  
 98  Id.  
 99  Id.  
 100  Id. at *2.  
 101  Id.  
 102  Id. at *3. 
 103  Alotto, 2010 WL 5186127, at *3 n.10 (internal citations omitted).  
 104  Zack, 2012 WL 832611, at *11–12. 
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plaintiff in Alotto had to rely on a theory of constructive discharge.105  
Also like the plaintiff in Zack, the plaintiff could not meet her burden 
to establish a constructive discharge.  The court held that “Plaintiff told 
Defendants that she considered herself fired after Defendants 
requested a doctor’s note indicating that Plaintiff could perform the 
requirements of her job.  No reasonable fact-finder could conclude 
that this request amounts to an adverse employment action against 
Plaintiff or involves outrageous, coercive or unconscionable 
conduct.”106  The court ultimately concluded that “[b]ecause Plaintiff 
cannot demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action, 
a required element for . . .  failure to accommodate claims, summary 
judgment will be granted to Defendants.”107 
Moreover, in White v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of N.J.,108 the 
Appellate Division recognized the current confusion with regard to the 
proper articulation of the prima facie case for failure to accommodate 
when it stated that an adverse employment consequence is part of a 
plaintiff’s proofs; the court, however, noted in a footnote that Victor 
“suggested, without deciding, that a plaintiff might be able to establish 
a failure-to-accommodate claim without showing a resulting adverse 
employment action.”109  The ambiguity was not dispositive in the case, 
as it was undisputed that the plaintiff in the case did in fact suffer an 
adverse employment consequence.110  Significantly, the court’s 
confusion over the requirements could have been problematic if the 
adverse employment consequence element were in dispute, as seen in 
Alotto and Zack. 
Such a case arose before District Court for the District of New 
Jersey in Bull v. UPS.111  In Bull, the plaintiff alleged, in part, disability 
discrimination under the LAD for being terminated after being 
assigned to light duty by her doctor after she sustained an injury in the 
workplace.112  The plaintiff testified at trial that she arrived at work one 
morning and was told that she would no longer be an employee at 
 
 105  Alotto, 2010 WL 5186127, at *3. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. 
 108  No. A-6333-11T4, 2013 N.J. Super. LEXIS 2169, at *6 (App.Div. Aug. 30, 2013). 
 109  Id. at *6 n.3. 
 110  Id. 
 111  Bull v. UPS, No. 07-2291 (KM)(MCA) 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89077 (D.N.J. July 
1, 2014) 
 112  Id. at *7–8.  
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UPS.113  The jury found in favor of UPS.114 The verdict form, however, 
indicated that the jury believed that Bull suffered from a disability, that 
she was performing her job prior to her alleged termination date, that 
she was able to perform the essential functions of her position, that 
UPS was aware of her need for an accommodation, that a reasonable 
accommodation existed, and that UPS “wrongfully did not make such 
a reasonable accommodation.”115  The jury, however, did not find that 
Bull was terminated, and as such she could not have been terminated 
on the basis of her disability.116  Bull challenged the verdict, via a 
motion for new trial, on the grounds that the jury verdict sheet was 
inadequate.117  Thus, the court was set to confront the issue of “whether 
any error in the verdict sheet here affected Ms. Bull’s substantial rights 
by inadequately or incorrectly guiding the jury’s findings as to essential 
issues.”118  Underlying this question was the issue left unresolved in 
Victor; namely, whether a jury finding of an adverse employment action 
was necessary, because if not, plaintiff could succeed on a theory of 
failure to accommodate.  Indeed, the court recognized that Ms. Bull’s 
“arguments boil down to a contention that termination of 
employment . . . is a superfluous consideration . . . [and that] [f]ailure 
to accommodate . . . is itself sufficient to make her case.”119 
The district court relied on a pre-Victor, 1998 case, Seiden v. Marina 
Associates,120 for the recitation of the prima facie case for failure to 
accommodate, which required an adverse employment 
consequence.121  The court stated that “at least thus far, the New Jersey 
courts have never merged the two elements of failure to accommodate 
and adverse employment action.”122  The court then addressed Victor, 
and explained that the New Jersey Supreme Court “acknowledged the 
possibility of an actionable failure to accommodate despite the lack of 
any ‘identifiable’ adverse action . . . [but] did not rule affirmatively.”123  
Therefore, the court concluded that “[a]bsent a state Supreme Court 
decision, the case law cited above [i.e. Seiden],  which is contrary to 
 
 113  Id. at *8.  
 114  Id. at *1. 
 115  Id. at *3. 
 116  Id. 
 117  Bull, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89077 at *15. 
 118  Id. at *17. 
 119  Id. at *23. 
 120  315 N.J. Super. 451 (1998) 
 121  Bull, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89077 at *18. 
 122  Id. at *30. 
 123  Id. 
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plaintiff’s position, is my best guide.  I can discern no trend that would 
allow me to predict confidently that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
would decide this issue in a manner favoring plaintiff here.”124  The 
court then went on to address other weaknesses in plaintiff’s argument 
on its way to denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.125 
Thus, Zack and Alotto are significant cases because each continued 
to apply the adverse employment consequence element, despite the 
language in Victor strongly suggesting that no additional adverse 
employment consequence would be necessary.  In Alotto, the plaintiff’s 
case hinged on proof of an adverse employment consequence and, in 
both Zack and Alotto, the plaintiff could not carry the high burden of a 
constructive discharge.  Moreover, the district court’s opinion in Bull 
directly addressed the tension resulting from Victor’s ambiguity, and 
took the position that despite the New Jersey Supreme Court’s strong 
suggestion in dicta, an adverse employment consequence is still a 
required proof as part of plaintiff’s prima facie case. 
B. Adverse Employment Consequence Not Required 
Since the Victor decision, several courts have interpreted the 
decision as separating the need for an adverse employment 
consequence from the prima facie case of failure to accommodate.  For 
example, in Whalen v. New Jersey Manufacturer’s Insurance Co., the court 
stated that “[i]n Victor, the Court recognized that a plaintiff could 
bring a failure-to-accommodate claim where there was no adverse 
employment action apart from the failure to accommodate.”126  This 
language in Whalen is significant because the court read Victor as 
dispensing with the third element of the prima facie case for failure to 
accommodate.  While the plaintiff in the case suffered an adverse 
employment consequence, rendering the issue moot, the court still 
acknowledged, albeit in dicta, that Victor stood for the proposition that 
no adverse employment consequence is necessary.  Similarly, in 
Fronczkiewicz v. Magellan Health Services, Inc., the court made a similar 
error in stating that Victor allows “plaintiffs ‘to proceed against 
employers who have failed to reasonably accommodate their 
disabilities or who have failed to engage in an interactive process even 
if they can point to no adverse employment consequence that 
resulted.’”127 
 
 124  Id. at *30–31. 
 125  Id. at *34–35. 
 126  2012 WL 3166601, at *19 n.4 (N.J. App. Div. Aug. 6, 2012). 
 127  No. 11-7542, 2012 WL 2357484, at *2 n.5 (D.N.J. June 20, 2012) (quoting Victor 
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Some courts have simply omitted the adverse employment 
consequence element in their articulation of the prima facie case.  For 
example, in Schellenberger v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., the court, citing 
Victor, articulated the prima facie case as follows: “A claim for failure to 
accommodate under the NJLAD requires that the plaintiff establish 
both that he was disabled within the meaning of the statute, and sought 
a reasonable accommodation that would to allow him to perform the 
essential functions of the position.”128  Conspicuously missing in the 
courts articulation of the prima facie case was the adverse employment 
consequence element.129 
Thus, in this line of cases, two of the courts, to wit, the Whalen and 
Fronczkiewicz courts, cited Victor as standing for the proposition that a 
claim of failure to accommodate required no additional adverse 
employment consequence.  Other decisions, by contrast, omit the 
adverse employment consequence element, citing Victor.  Thus, each 
of these decisions relies on Victor for the proposition that no adverse 
employment consequence is necessary to establish a prima facie case for 
failure to accommodate under the LAD. 
IV.  AN ARGUMENT FOR THE COURT TO TAKE A DEFINITIVE STAND AND 
DECLARE THAT FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE REQUIRES NO ADVERSE 
EMPLOYMENT CONSEQUENCE 
As the discussion of the case law in Part III illustrates, there is 
uncertainty in application of the court’s decision in Victor.  This 
ambiguity stems from the court’s strong suggestion in dicta that under 
the right factual circumstances no adverse employment consequence 
would be necessary, while at the same time failing to make a definitive 
ruling on the issue.  This inconsistency demands that the court grant 
certification to provide a definitive answer to the question.  The lack 
of a uniform standard has already led to inconsistent application and 
divergent results.130  While the courts that have misapplied the holding 
in Victor have done so only in dicta,131 namely in cases in which there 
was an adverse employment consequence, there is danger in 
misapplication in future circumstances.  The need for clarity in the law 
 
v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 421 (2010)). 
 128  No. 10-2398, 2011 WL 5416432, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2011). 
 129  See also St. Cyr v. Brandywine Senior Living, LLC, No. 10-5868, 2012 WL 2344858 
(D.N.J. June 20, 2012) (similarly omitting the adverse employment consequence 
element and citing Victor, 203 N.J. 383); Del Vecchio v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 2014 N.J. 
Super. LEXIS 2039, at *19 (App. Div. Aug. 15, 2014) (same). 
 130  See supra Part III. 
 131  See e.g., Whalen, 2012 WL 3166601, at *1; Fronczkiewicz, 2012 WL 2357484, at *1. 
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extends beyond just the confines of the courtroom: the Victor decision 
has implications for employers’ human resources departments, as the 
Victor decision can be read to impart greater significance on the 
interactive process, which has not heretofore been sufficient, on its 
own, to impose liability on the employer.132  The Victor decision, given 
its lengthy analysis of an otherwise moot issue in the case, while failing 
to definitively provide binding precedent, has left judges, employers, 
and employees in a difficult predicament, namely whether to rely on 
the longstanding requirement of an adverse employment 
consequence, or, to read the proverbial tea leaves, and plan for the 
likely outcome that an adverse employment consequence will not be 
required.133  Thus, the question of what the correct standard is requires 
immediate attention.  The decision has implications for employers, 
employees, and courts.  While there are strong arguments for both 
approaches, this comment argues that due to the broad construction 
of the LAD, and as a matter of public policy, the court in Victor was 
correct to suggest that no additional adverse employment 
consequence should be necessary. 
In Victor, the court stated that “we . . . cannot entirely foreclose 
the possibility of circumstances that would give rise to a claim for 
failure to accommodate even without an identifiable adverse 
employment consequence.”134  While Victor’s case was “a poor vehicle 
in which to find the definitive answer”135 to the question, the court was 
correct to leave the possibility open that such factual circumstances 
 
 132  See 21 No. 12 ADA Compliance Guide Newsletter (explaining that “[e]mployers 
in New Jersey may be held liable for failing to engage in the interactive process of 
finding an accommodation for an employee with a disability, even if the employee is 
not subject to an adverse action. . . .”) 
 133  See, e.g., 19 No. 1 N.J. Emp. L. Letter 4.  
[The Victor] decision is striking because of the court’s willingness to 
analyze in thorough detail an issue that it eventually decided was moot.  
While the outcome was a victory for the state police, the decision is likely 
to make failure-to-accommodate claims more difficult to defend against 
in the future.  While the New Jersey Supreme Court felt it couldn’t 
deliver a binding decision on whether failure-to-accommodate claims 
must include an adverse employment action, it left little question that it 
believes an adverse action is necessary.  Given that all of the justices 
joined in the opinion, any New Jersey court addressing the issue will 
likely follow the nonbinding but forceful opinion delivered in this case. 
As a result, you should be all the more careful in considering of your 
employees’ reasonable accommodation requests and engaging in the 
interactive process with them.  
Id. 
 134  Victor, 203 N.J. at 422. 
 135  Id.  
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may exist. 
A. Legislative Intent and Supporting Case Law 
The legislative intent of the LAD is best served by allowing an 
employee “whose requests are not addressed or are denied, and who 
continue[s] nonetheless to toil on”136 to have a proper remedy.  As 
mentioned above, in passing the LAD, the New Jersey Legislature 
found that “practices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants, 
because of . . . disability . . . are matters of concern to the government 
of the state.”137  Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated 
that it is the “clear public policy of th[e] State . . . to abolish 
discrimination in the work place” and that the overarching goal of the 
LAD is the “eradication ‘of the cancer of discrimination.’”138  The Victor 
court noted that while the question of whether a failure to 
accommodate without an adverse employment consequence is 
unsettled at the federal level, “our LAD’s broad remedial purposes and 
the wide scope of its coverage for disabilities as compared to the ADA 
support an expansive view of protecting rights of persons with 
disabilities in the workplace.”139  The court went on to make a more 
definitive statement that “[t]he LAD’s purposes suggest that we chart 
a course to permit plaintiffs to proceed against employers who have 
failed to reasonably accommodate their disabilities or who have failed 
to engage in an interactive process even if they can point to no adverse 
employment consequence that resulted.”140  Various courts prior to the 
Victor decision had emphasized the broad scope of the LAD in 
comparison with the ADA.141 
Thus, as the legislative findings and case law suggest, the LAD was 
intended to cast a wide net and provide broad protections against 
discrimination.  The broad, remedial nature of the LAD supports the 
court’s suggestion that an employer’s failure to accommodate the 
disability of an employee contravenes the legislature’s intent.  A rule 
 
 136  Id. at 421. 
 137  See text supra accompanying note 13. 
 138  Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334 (1988). 
 139  Victor, 203 N.J. at 420–21.  
 140  Id.; see Panettieri v. C. V. Hill Refrigeration, 159 N.J. Super. 472, 483 (App. Div. 
1978) (“Since the inception of the Law Against Discrimination . . . our courts have 
repeatedly recognized its humanitarian concerns, its remedial nature and the liberal 
construction to be accorded it.”) 
 141  See, e.g., Soules v. Mount Holiness Mem’l Park, 354 N.J. Super. 569, 574 (App. 
Div. 2002) (“LAD’s definition of handicap, and its scope, is not comparable to the 
definitions and scope of handicap or disability under the ADA”). 
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allowing no cause of action for an employee who is not accommodated 
but suffers no adverse employment consequence would create a 
situation in which the employer may choose not to provide an 
accommodation to the employee so long as the failure to do so does 
not rise to the level of a constructive discharge142 or hostile work 
environment.143  As the Victor court noted, there may be “circumstances 
in which such an employee’s proofs, while falling short of [the hostile 
work environment] standard, would cry out for a remedy.”144  The LAD 
seeks “to secure to handicapped individuals full and equal access to 
society, bounded only by the actual physical limits that they cannot 
surmount.”145  Thus, allowing this additional, albeit narrow, protection 
for employees would be consistent with the purposes and construction 
of the LAD because it would further eradicate discrimination against 
disabled individuals.  Even if a handicapped employee suffers no 
adverse employment consequence, if his or her disability is not 
reasonably accommodated by the employer, he or she would 
nonetheless be precluded from enjoying “full and equal access to 
society.”146 
B. The Scope of the LAD and ADA 
Under the ADA, an employer is required to provide not only an 
accommodation to “enable an individual with a disability who is 
qualified to perform the essential functions of that position,”147 but also 
“[m]odifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity’s 
employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of 
employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees 
without disabilities.”148  This includes “making the workplace readily 
 
 142  See text supra accompanying note 92 (noting the high bar for constructive 
discharge).  
 143  New Jersey courts have “specifically adopted the ‘severe or pervasive’ test as part 
of its comprehensive standard,” which conforms to the Title VII analysis at the federal 
level.  Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 498 (1998) (citing Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 
132 N.J. 587, 606 (1993)); see Dorfman v. Pine Hill Bd. of Educ., 346 F. App’x 825, 
828–29 (3d Cir. 2009) (articulating the test for hostile work environment under the 
LAD: “employee must show that the employer’s conduct: (1) would not have occurred 
but for the employee’s protected characteristic; and the conduct was (2) severe or 
pervasive enough to make a (3) reasonable person believe that (4) the conditions of 
employment are altered and the working environment is hostile or abusive.”). 
 144  Victor, 203 N.J. at 421–22. 
 145  Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 89 N.J. 483, 492 (1982).   
 146  Id. 
 147  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (2014). 
 148  § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii). 
OBERGFELL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:11 PM 
1000 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:977 
 
accessible to and usable by people with disabilities.”149  The employer 
is responsible under Title I “for making facilities accessible to qualified 
applicants and employees with disabilities as a reasonable 
accommodation . . . .”150  Thus, the reasonable accommodation 
requirement under the ADA goes beyond just simply providing an 
accommodation to perform one’s job; it also requires accessibility to 
the facilities in the building,151 even if not providing such accessibility 
would not rise to the level of a constructive discharge. 
The language in the regulation supplementing the LAD also 
states that a reasonable accommodation includes “[m]aking facilities 
used by employees readily accessible and usable by people with 
disabilities.”152  It follows that a claim of failure to accommodate should 
not have to be linked to an adverse employment consequence in order 
to be actionable.  Taking, for example, a hypothetical situation of the 
HIV-positive reporter who was using an electric scooter because of 
fatigue from walking:153 a failure to provide the ramp would likely be 
an actionable claim, regardless of whether or not there was an adverse 
employment consequence attached to it.  The same principles apply to 
the LAD, which endeavors not only to provide disabled employees with 
the minimum required accommodation to allow them to perform the 
functions of the position, but also to allow equal access to society.154  
Thus, a mandated link between the failure to accommodate and an 
adverse employment consequence undercuts the goals of the LAD and 
prevents disabled persons from receiving equal treatment. 
Moreover, as the court in Nawrot v. CPC International suggested in 
the context of the ADA, requiring an adverse employment 
consequence “creates employer liability only if the employee suffered 
an adverse employment action because of his disability,” shielding the 
employer from liability “where known disabilities are not 
 
 149  U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, THE ADA: YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS AN 
EMPLOYER, available at  http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/ada17.html (last modified Aug. 1, 
2008). 
 150  Id. 
 151  See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PERSONS WITH HIV/AIDS, available at 
http://www.ada.gov/archive/hivqanda.txt (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) (citing as an 
example of a reasonable accommodation a situation where “[a]n HIV-positive 
newspaper editor who tired easily from walking began to use an electric scooter to get 
around.  His employer installed a ramp at the entrance to the building in which the 
editor worked so that the editor could use his scooter at the office.”). 
 152  N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:13-2.5(b)(1)(i) (2015). 
 153  See supra note 151. 
 154  Lasky v. Borough of Hightstown, 426 N.J. Super. 68, 75 (App. Div. 2012). 
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accommodated simply for management’s laziness or cost benefit 
analysis.”155  Again, such a scheme would cut against the goals of the 
LAD and would serve only to shift the burden to the party least able to 
guard against abuse.  If an employee has no cause of action where his 
or her employer’s failure to accommodate does not rise to the level of 
a constructive discharge, the employer has no incentive to provide a 
reasonable accommodation so long as no other adverse employment 
consequence follows.  In contrast, allowing such a cause of action 
would leverage the risk of litigation against the employer, who would 
then be more compelled to offer the accommodation where it is 
needed. 
C. The Interactive Process 
A major possible implication of the Victor decision is that if, 
indeed, no adverse employment consequence is required, the 
interactive process becomes more significant.  As discussed supra,156 the 
interactive process was not an independent source of liability under 
the LAD; instead, it was a consideration of the second prong of the 
prima facie case looking to the employee’s ability to perform the 
essential functions of the position.  The interactive process requires 
the employer to consider whether a reasonable accommodation would 
be possible before terminating or failing to hire an employee.157  In 
Tynan, the Appellate Division, looking to the ADA for guidance, 
concluded that an employer’s bad faith in failing to engage in an 
interactive process with an employee may impose liability on the 
employer.158  Combining the Tynan decision with the possible 
implications of Victor, an employee may prevail on a claim of failure to 
accommodate when an employer knows about an employee’s disability 
and fails to engage in an interactive process. 
Consider, for example, the facts of Victor.  If no adverse 
employment consequence was necessary, and the facts were such that 
Victor could establish that he was disabled, the determination of 
whether his employer engaged in an interactive process becomes an 
important, dispositive question.159  Indeed, had Victor established that 
he was disabled, it is possible that the case would have been decided in 
 
 155  Nawrot v. CPC Int’l, 259 F. Supp. 2d 716, 724 (N.D. Ill. 2003); see supra note 49 
and accompanying text. 
 156  See supra Part II.B. 
 157  N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:13-2.5(b)(2). 
 158  Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Super. Ct., 351 N.J. Super. 385, 400–04 (App. Div. 2002). 
 159  See generally Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383 (2010).  
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his favor, as he made his request for an accommodation clear to his 
employer and his supervisor did not examine possible 
accommodations, but rather required Victor to perform his normal 
duties in spite of his disability.160 
D. The Remedy Issue 
The question remains that even if a cause of action is allowed for 
failure to accommodate absent an adverse employment consequence, 
what remedy would the employee be entitled to?  Normally, an 
employee may file a complaint with the New Jersey Division of Civil 
Rights (“DCR”) or in the Superior Court.161  The legislature has 
authorized compensatory and punitive damages,162 in addition to 
damages for emotional distress.163  The legislature held that: 
[B]ecause of discrimination, people suffer personal 
hardships, and the State suffers a grievous harm.  The 
personal hardships include: economic loss; time loss; 
physical and emotional stress; and in some cases severe 
emotional trauma, illness, homelessness or other irreparable 
harm resulting from the strain of employment controversies; 
relocation, search and moving difficulties; anxiety caused by 
lack of information, uncertainty, and resultant planning 
difficulty; career, education, family and social disruption; 
and adjustment problems, which particularly impact on 
those protected by this act.  Such harms have, under the 
common law, given rise to legal remedies, including 
compensatory and punitive damages.  The Legislature 
intends that such damages be available to all persons 
protected by this act and that this act shall be liberally 
construed in combination with other protections available 
under the laws of this State.164 
Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, 
explained that a plaintiff need not demonstrate serious psychological 
 
 160  Id. at 391–92. 
 161  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-13 (1990). 
 162  Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, 132 N.J. 587, 610 (N.J. 1993); But see Maczik v. Gilford 
Park Yacht Club, 271 N.J. Super. 439, 453 (App. Div. 1994) (explaining that punitive 
damages may not be awarded in administrative proceedings, but qualifying that “while 
common law punitive damages are not available, the Director can award treble 
economic damages for certain discriminatory conduct and can assess statutory 
penalties”). 
 163  See Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 76–78 (2004) (explaining that the “LAD permits 
a lower evidentiary threshold” than Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 
allowing emotional distress damages even without expert testimony). 
 164  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (2007). 
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harm in order to recover, nor must a plaintiff establish economic loss, 
all that is required is a plaintiff prove that he or she was discriminated 
against.165  Punitive damages are awarded under the LAD only when 
the conduct is egregious; i.e., “only in the event of actual participation 
by upper management or willful indifference.”166  The court will look 
for wanton and reckless conduct when deciding whether punitive 
damages are appropriate.167 
In a case of failure to accommodate absent an adverse 
employment consequence, many of the aforementioned damages will 
not be applicable.  The employee will not have lost his or her position, 
will not have been demoted, and will not have suffered any permanent 
change in employment.  Thus, there will be no real occasion to award 
compensatory damages for economic loss.  It is possible that damages 
for emotional distress may be applicable.  As aforementioned, a claim 
of emotional distress under the LAD is not as burdensome as a claim 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress.168  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court has stated that “[u]nderlying the LAD’s expansive 
language advocating the elimination of discrimination is also the 
directive that we compensate victims for economic and noneconomic 
injuries attributable to an employer’s discriminatory conduct.”169  The 
court has recognized that to “suffer humiliation, embarrassment and 
 
 165  Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 610 (“The plaintiff’s injury need be no more tangible or 
serious than that the conditions of employment have been altered . . . . Although the 
LAD provides for compensatory and punitive damages, it is not primarily a tort 
scheme; rather, its primary purpose is to end discrimination. Because discrimination 
itself is the harm that the LAD seeks to eradicate, additional harms need not be shown 
in order to state a claim under the LAD.”) 
 166  Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 313–14 (1995) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 167  See Levinson v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 868 F.2d 558, 562 (3d Cir. 1989) (citations 
omitted) (reviewing the LAD and concluding that “we feel certain that the court would 
in some cases find that employment discrimination was wantonly reckless or malicious 
conduct reflecting intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an evil-minded act or a 
disregard of the rights of another, the type of conduct which it has held may justify an 
award of punitive damages”). 
 168  See Tarr, 181 N.J. at 82 (holding that “compensatory damages for emotional 
distress, including humiliation and indignity resulting from willful discriminatory 
conduct, are remedies that require a far less stringent standard of proof than that 
required for a tort-based emotional distress cause of action.  We hold that in 
discrimination cases, which by definition involve willful conduct, the victim may 
recover all natural consequences of that wrongful conduct, including emotional 
distress and mental anguish damages arising out of embarrassment, humiliation, and 
other intangible injuries.”). 
 169  Id. at 80 (emphasis added).  
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indignity is by definition to suffer emotional distress”170 and that the 
victim of discrimination should be allowed to recover “without 
corroborative proof, permanency of response, or other physical or 
psychological symptoms rendering the emotional distress severe or 
substantial.”171  Thus, the remedy for a claim of failure to accommodate 
can result in a recovery for emotional distress.  The court has made 
clear that noneconomic injuries are compensable under the LAD and 
that the broad, remedial nature of the statute seeks to provide a 
remedy to victims of discrimination, even if the claim does not rise to 
the level of a tort-based claim for emotional distress.172  Also, punitive 
damages may result if the failure to accommodate the disability is done 
maliciously or wantonly.173 
As Lehmann made clear, it is important to separate the damages 
inquiry from the question of liability. A plaintiff must decide whether, 
given the circumstances of his or her case, bringing suit is in his or her 
best interest.  Given the broad, protective embrace of the LAD and its 
desire to eliminate all forms of discrimination, however, it seems 
counterintuitive to bar these claims from moving forward simply 
because, in some cases, there may not be extensive damages to collect. 
E. Protections for Employer 
A possible counterargument to dispensing with the adverse 
employment consequence element is that allowing a cause of action 
for failing to accommodate a disability would open the floodgates to 
increased litigation and tenuous claims in what is already a very 
litigious area of law.174  While it is true that such a holding would open 
up more potential liability for the employer, the regulations, as well as 
procedural mechanisms, offer the employer sufficient protection from 
liability.  Moreover, as the court in Victor suggested, most cases 
involving a claim of failure to accommodate will have some sort of 
adverse employment consequence attached to them.175  Thus, the fear 
 
 170  Id. at 81 (citation omitted). 
 171  Id. 
 172  Id. at 82.  
 173  Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 610. 
 174  See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, More Workers Complain of Bias on the Job, a Trend 
Linked to Widespread Layoffs, N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/01/12/business/12bias.html?_r=0; see also Disability-related employment 
discrimination claims increased in 2012, THE ARC (Feb. 4, 2013), 
http://insider.thearc.org/2013/02/04/disability-related-employment-
discrimination-claims-increased-in-2012/. 
 175  Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 421 (2010) (“Such cases would be unusual, if not 
rare, for it will ordinarily be true that a disabled employee who has been unsuccessful 
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of increase in litigation if a cause of action is permitted for employees 
who are not accommodated absent an adverse employment 
consequence is tempered by the reality that such a factual 
circumstance will be rare, and that most cases involving a claim of 
failure to accommodate will involve an adverse employment 
consequence. 
In addition, procedural safeguards have been established for 
employers. A plaintiff must make a threshold showing that he or she is 
disabled within the meaning of the statute.  New Jersey courts have 
continuously made clear that the burden rests with the plaintiff to 
establish each element of the prima facie case in employment 
discrimination claims.176  The employee must first prove that he or she 
is disabled within the meaning of the LAD.177  In order to initiate the 
interactive process, a plaintiff must make the need for an 
accommodation known to his or her employer.178  This proved to be an 
important factor in the Victor case itself.  The fact that Victor could not 
prove that he was disabled on the date when he requested an 
accommodation shielded the defendants from liability and effectively 
rendered the adverse employment consequence element irrelevant.179 
 
 
Second, New Jersey courts have made clear that in order to prevail 
on a claim of failure to accommodate, the employee must show that he 
or she was capable of performing the essential functions of his or her 
position.180  As part of this analysis, the court will require a plaintiff to 
“make a facial showing that his proposed accommodation was possible, 
and that the costs associated with the accommodation were not clearly 
disproportionate to the benefits.”181  If a plaintiff makes this showing, 
the employer gets the opportunity “to prove as an affirmative defense 
 
in securing an accommodation will indeed suffer an adverse employment 
consequence.”). 
 176  Id. at 408 (“All employment discrimination claims require the plaintiff to bear 
the burden of proving the elements of a prima facie case.”). 
 177  Bosshard v. Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr., 345 N.J. Super. 78, 91 (App. Div. 
2001).  
 178  See Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Super. Ct., 351 N.J. Super. 385, 400 (App. Div. 2002). 
 179  Victor, 203 N.J. at 422. 
 180  See id. at 410 (noting that the second element of the prima facie case for a claim 
of disability discrimination requires the plaintiff to prove “that he or she is qualified 
to perform the essential functions of the job, or was performing those essential 
functions, either with or without a reasonable accommodation”) (citation omitted). 
 181  Boyce v. Lucent Techs., 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1680, at *14 (App. Div. 
June 21, 2007). 
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that the requested accommodation was unreasonable.”182 
For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that a 
request for permanent light duty work rendered the employee unable 
to fulfill the essential functions of the position.183  Moreover, New Jersey 
courts have held that “reasonably regular, reliable, and predictable 
attendance is a necessary element of most jobs.  An employee who does 
not come to work cannot perform any of her job functions, essential 
or otherwise.”184  The employee may not proceed with a claim of failure 
to accommodate if he or she is unable to perform the essential 




Third, the LAD similarly makes clear that the employer need not 
provide an accommodation that imposes an undue hardship on the 
employer.186  The statute states that a determination of undue hardship 
is made on a case-by-case basis and points to several factors to guide 
the determination.187  A defense of undue hardship is considered an 
affirmative defense, however, and the burden of proof rests on the 
employer.188  Nevertheless, the employer retains the protection under 
the statute of demonstrating that an accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship, which would absolve the employer from liability for 
failing to accommodate.  For example, in Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, 
 
 182  Id. (citing Gaul v. Lucent Techs., 134 F.3d 576, 581 (3d Cir. N.J. 1998). 
 183  Raspa v. Office of Sheriff of Cnty. of Gloucester, 191 N.J. 323, 327 (2007).  
We hold that an employee must possess the bona fide occupational 
qualifications for the job position that employee seeks to occupy in order 
to trigger an employer’s obligation to reasonably accommodate the 
employee to the extent required by the LAD.  In that context, we further 
hold that an employer may reasonably limit light duty assignments to 
those employees whose disabilities are temporary, and that the 
availability of light duty assignments for temporarily disabled employees 
does not give rise to any additional duty on the part of the employer to 
assign a permanently disabled employee indefinitely to an otherwise 
restricted light duty assignment.  
Id.  
 184  Svarnas v. AT&T Commc’ns, 326 N.J. Super. 59, 78 (App. Div. 1999) (citations 
omitted). 
 185  See Ensslin v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 275 N.J. Super. 352, 367 (App. Div. 1994) 
(finding that essential functions of the position, namely “apprehension and securing 
of suspects and prisoners” could not be completed by a police officer who was 
paralyzed after an accident). 
 186  N.J. ADMIN. CODE 13:13-2.5(b) (2015). 
 187  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 188  Lasky v. Moorestown Twp., 425 N.J. Super. 530, 545 (App. Div. 2012). 
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Inc., the Third Circuit found that plaintiff’s request to be transferred 
away from co-workers who caused “inordinate stress” was unreasonable 
because of the burden it would have on the ability of the employer to 
make personnel decisions.189 
Thus, while removing the requirement of an adverse employment 
consequence as part of the prima facie case exposes employers to more 
potential liability, there are adequate safeguards that courts must 
faithfully apply to protect employers from frivolous complaints.  The 
LAD, despite its broad scope, makes clear that an employee is not 
entitled to each and every conceivable accommodation.190  As one 
author explained: 
[e]ven if the Court eventually decides that a disabled 
employee need not establish that he or she suffered an 
adverse employment consequence as part of the prima 
facie LAD case, that employee plaintiff will be hard-pressed to 
succeed where the evidence shows that the employer 
engaged in the interactive process and offered a reasonable 
accommodation, which the employee declined.191 
The statute, therefore, only requires employers to act in good faith to 
accommodate an employee after becoming aware of an employee’s 
disability.  By eliminating the need for an adverse employment 
consequence, the interactive process becomes very important, as 
failure to engage in an interactive process may expose the employer to 
liability.  An employer may shield itself from liability by engaging in an 
interactive process with the disabled employee upon becoming aware 
of the employee’s need for an accommodation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As the court in Victor suggested, an employee should be permitted 
to pursue a cause of action for failure to accommodate a disability even 
in the absence of an adverse employment consequence.  The broad, 
remedial nature of the LAD and the legislature’s goal to eradicate 
discrimination and provide disabled persons with full and equal access 
 
 189  Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 579 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 190  See Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Super. Ct., 351 N.J. Super. 385, 397 (App. Div. 2002) 
(citation omitted) (explaining that an “employer’s duty to accommodate extends only 
so far as necessary to allow ‘a disabled employee to perform the essential functions of 
his job.  It does not require acquiescence to the employee’s every demand.’”). 
 191  Trent S. Dickey & David H. Ganz, Is An Adverse Employment Consequence A 
Necessary Element For A Failure To Accommodate Claim In New Jersey?, THE METRO. 
CORPORATE COUNSEL 1, 34 (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/ 
pdf/2010/November/34.pdf.  
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to society bolsters the argument that a cause of action should be 
allowed where an employee is not accommodated but has not suffered 
an adverse employment consequence.  In addition to dovetailing with 
the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the LAD, allowing a cause of 
action absent an adverse employment consequence incentivizes 
employers to be vigilant and proactive in providing accommodations.  
By allowing a cause of action for failure to accommodate a disability, 
the employer will be faced with the prospect of litigation, yet will also 
be protected by procedural mechanisms in the statute, namely, that 
the requested accommodation cannot be unduly burdensome and that 
the plaintiff must be able to perform the essential functions of the 
position.  These protections along with the relatively rare nature of 
these types of cases limit the scope of litigation and insulate the 
employer from excessive liability.  Thus, because of the broad 
construction of the LAD, and as a matter of public policy, employees 
should be able proceed on a claim of failure to accommodate even 
absent an adverse employment consequence. 
 
